moos-alog-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from MOOS log files, creating a potential surface for instructions embedded in data to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from
.alogfiles using tools such asalogscan,aloggrep, andaloghelm. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill provides no instructions to use delimiters or ignore potential commands within the log content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to execute specific binaries (
alog*), a local wrapper script (scripts/alogvars.sh), and generic shell/Python code for analysis tasks. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing system-level binaries and local scripts to perform its primary function.
- It assumes the availability of
aloggrep,aloghelm, andalogscanin the path. - It uses a custom bash script
scripts/alogvars.shwhich executesalogscanand processes the results viaawk. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to generate and run shell or Python code for custom data analysis.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/alog-tool-guide.mdspecify using "shell or Python for custom logic" for geometric or numeric questions.
Audit Metadata