surf-kubectl-troubleshoot
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the sensitive file path
~/.config/sops/age/keys.txtto diagnose SOPS decryption failures. Accessing private cryptographic keys, even for troubleshooting, increases the risk of credential exposure. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The execution of
kubectl get secrets,kubectl describe pod, andkubectl logscan expose sensitive information in the agent's context, including platform-provisioned database credentials, application secrets, and environment variables. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted output from cluster resources and external tools which could be manipulated by an attacker to influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: Output from
kubectl logs,kubectl describe,kubectl get events, andgit status(as specified in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; the instructions do not implement markers or warnings to disregard instructions embedded in the analyzed logs or resource metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution, resource annotation via
kubectl, file system permission changes (chmod), and local script execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from the Kubernetes API or logs before it is interpreted by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run various shell commands, including
kubectl,git,sops, andbash. It specifically references local scripts such asscripts/sops-doctor.shand useskubectl annotateto perform reconciliation tasks. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates commands by interpolating user-provided inputs like
<name>,<ns>, and<app>into shell templates. This pattern presents a potential for command injection if the inputs are derived from untrusted sources and not properly handled by the platform.
Audit Metadata