harness-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/audit.pyinvokes thegitbinary to retrieve repository information. - Evidence:
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], ...)is used in thegitutility function. - Context: The calls are made using an argument list rather than a shell string, which prevents command injection via the
--repoargument. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads data from project manifest and memory files, which are then included in the audit report provided to the agent.
- Ingestion points: File reads in
scripts/audit.pyfor files such asmanifest.json,memory/topics/*.json, andpolicy.json. - Boundary markers: Absent. The audit report is generated as a structured JSON object but does not contain explicit instructions for the agent to ignore content within the data fields.
- Capability inventory: File system writes via
atomic_write(to rebuildcatalog.jsonl) and command execution viagitsubprocess calls. - Sanitization: Absent. Content retrieved from JSON files is parsed and re-serialized into the final audit output without validation or escaping of string values.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses and reports on project identities and session metadata stored in the user's home directory.
- Evidence: The
audit_projectfunction inscripts/audit.pyreads from the path defined by$HARNESS_HOME(defaulting to~/.harness/projects).
Audit Metadata