skills/cekrauseee/harness/harness-pr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

harness-pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources such as git diffs, commit messages, and test results to generate pull request descriptions. This represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded within the code changes or commit history.
  • Ingestion points: As described in SKILL.md, the agent reads the "complete diff against that base", "included commits", and "relevant verification output".
  • Boundary markers: The skill contains a mandatory "Authorization Boundary" section that explicitly forbids publishing or pushing changes without user consent, which serves as a primary control.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to read files from the repository, execute the local scripts/render_pr.py tool, and interact with external pull request APIs to update or publish content.
  • Sanitization: The scripts/render_pr.py script performs structural validation of the pull request title but does not specifically sanitize the summary or change descriptions for embedded AI instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a local script to format and validate data.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to run python3 scripts/render_pr.py with multiple arguments derived from its analysis of the diff.
  • Safety: The script (scripts/render_pr.py) is bundled with the skill and relies exclusively on Python standard libraries (argparse, json, re, sys). It does not perform network operations, access sensitive credentials, or attempt to escalate privileges.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 06:37 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — harness-pr