harness-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources such as git diffs, commit messages, and test results to generate pull request descriptions. This represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded within the code changes or commit history.
- Ingestion points: As described in
SKILL.md, the agent reads the "complete diff against that base", "included commits", and "relevant verification output". - Boundary markers: The skill contains a mandatory "Authorization Boundary" section that explicitly forbids publishing or pushing changes without user consent, which serves as a primary control.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to read files from the repository, execute the local
scripts/render_pr.pytool, and interact with external pull request APIs to update or publish content. - Sanitization: The
scripts/render_pr.pyscript performs structural validation of the pull request title but does not specifically sanitize the summary or change descriptions for embedded AI instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a local script to format and validate data.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runpython3 scripts/render_pr.pywith multiple arguments derived from its analysis of the diff. - Safety: The script (
scripts/render_pr.py) is bundled with the skill and relies exclusively on Python standard libraries (argparse,json,re,sys). It does not perform network operations, access sensitive credentials, or attempt to escalate privileges.
Audit Metadata