cekura-bot-test-writer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on processing untrusted external data from pull request diffs and Git history.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read hunks and commit metadata using
git diffandgit log(Step 0 and Step 1 inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or strict isolation prompts to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the processed diff content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the
Edittool to modify repository files and theBashtool to execute shell commands and post PR comments via the GitHub CLI. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering applied to the diff data before it is interpreted by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires a wide range of shell commands to perform its analysis and validation workflow.
- Evidence: The agent executes commands such as
grep,git, andpython3for repository searches, diff resolution, and running local testing scripts (lint_suite.py,run_suite.py). - Context: These operations are scoped to the project environment and are standard for development-oriented agents, but represent an active command execution surface.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates with external tooling and configuration provided by the vendor and trusted sources.
- Evidence: Reference documentation (
pr-automation.md) describes utilizingnpxto fetch skill bundles from thecekura-aivendor and using theanthropics/claude-code-actionin automation workflows. - Context: These resources are identified as originating from the skill's specific vendor or established trusted organizations.
Audit Metadata