ego-browser

SUSPICIOUS: the browser automation capabilities are largely aligned with the stated purpose, but the trust model is high risk. The skill requires installing and running an unverifiable closed-source same-org binary from a downloaded DMG, removes quarantine, and then uses the user's authenticated browser state to act on websites. This is coherent for a browser skill, but the install and credential/session exposure are disproportionate enough to classify as suspicious rather than benign.

No explicit backdoor/persistence/exfiltration logic is evident in this installer/launcher script itself. However, it creates a significant macOS supply-chain risk: it downloads and mounts a remote DMG (and possibly runs an included .pkg) without verifying integrity or authenticity, then removes com.apple.quarantine and performs privileged installation into /Applications before launching. If the CDN content (or transport path) were tampered with, this script would directly deliver and execute the attacker’s payload with elevated installation impact.