managing-end-users
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to process and apply configuration data from external files, which creates a vulnerability to instructions embedded in that data.\n
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read configuration data from
group.json,role.json, andserver.jsonfiles inreferences/cli.md, and to use abodyparameter for theupsert_mcp_servertool inreferences/mcp.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore potential commands hidden within the JSON structures of these files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
celigoCLI to execute administrative commands and theupsert_mcp_servertool to update server settings, providing significant leverage if an injection occurs.\n - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization steps are defined for the content of the configuration files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata