ticket-check
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill programmatically accesses the local configuration file at
~/.linearctl/config.jsonto extract a stored API key for authentication. - Evidence:
API_KEY=$(jq -r '.profiles | to_entries[0].value.apiKey' ~/.linearctl/config.json)inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several command-line tools to interact with the environment, version control, and external APIs.
- Evidence: Execution of
git branch,git diff,gh issue,lc issue,lc comment,jq, andcurlcommands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches file attachments from Linear's official upload domain for assessment purposes.
- Evidence: Uses
curlto download files fromuploads.linear.appas described in the attachment handling logic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from external sources (ticket descriptions and comments) which are then processed by the agent to determine clarity and alignment.
- Ingestion points: Ticket title, description, labels, and comment history retrieved via CLI tools (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill processes the text directly into assessment dimensions without delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the ticket data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (
git,curl), file system reading, and specialized CLI tools (gh,lc). - Sanitization: Absent. The raw text from comments and attachments is used directly to drive the grading logic, creating a surface for potential instruction override if the ticket content contains malicious prompts.
Audit Metadata