higgsfield-generate
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill installs the
higgsfieldCLI by piping a remote script from GitHub directly to the shell (curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh). This execution method lacks integrity verification and allows for the execution of arbitrary code from an external source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads software and configuration from a third-party GitHub repository. It also retrieves data from external URLs provided by the user to create marketing content, introducing unverified data into the agent's operating context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to run the Higgsfield CLI. It constructs shell commands using user-supplied inputs like prompts and URLs, which could be vulnerable to command injection if the agent or the CLI does not properly sanitize these inputs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) by ingesting untrusted data from URLs and video analysis.
- Ingestion points: Data enters through
products fetch --urlinSKILL.mdandreferences/marketing-products.md, and via video analysis reports from thebrain_activitymodel. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate external user data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool for file system access and network operations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or validation for the fetched external content before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata