higgsfield-product-photoshoot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's bootstrap process executes a remote script from GitHub by piping it directly to the shell:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh. This pattern is inherently dangerous as it executes unverified code from an external source. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to command injection because it instructs the agent to place user-provided interview responses directly into the
--promptargument of a Bash command. A malicious user could provide shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&, or backticks) to execute unauthorized local commands. - Ingestion points: User descriptions from the 'Pre-generation interview' in
SKILL.mdare used as CLI arguments. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat the user input as non-executable data.
- Capability inventory: The skill explicitly allows
Bashviaallowed-tools, providing a broad attack surface for command execution. - Sanitization: There are no instructions to sanitize, escape, or validate the user-provided strings before they are interpolated into the shell command.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses the
Bashtool to run CLI commands for image generation (higgsfield product-photoshoot create) and authentication (higgsfield auth login). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads resources from the
higgsfield-aiGitHub organization during the bootstrap phase.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata