higgsfield-product-photoshoot

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's bootstrap process executes a remote script from GitHub by piping it directly to the shell: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh. This pattern is inherently dangerous as it executes unverified code from an external source.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to command injection because it instructs the agent to place user-provided interview responses directly into the --prompt argument of a Bash command. A malicious user could provide shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, or backticks) to execute unauthorized local commands.
  • Ingestion points: User descriptions from the 'Pre-generation interview' in SKILL.md are used as CLI arguments.
  • Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat the user input as non-executable data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill explicitly allows Bash via allowed-tools, providing a broad attack surface for command execution.
  • Sanitization: There are no instructions to sanitize, escape, or validate the user-provided strings before they are interpolated into the shell command.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses the Bash tool to run CLI commands for image generation (higgsfield product-photoshoot create) and authentication (higgsfield auth login).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads resources from the higgsfield-ai GitHub organization during the bootstrap phase.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 25, 2026, 11:07 AM