kai-growth-hacker
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project files and external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads
MARKETING.mdfrom the project root and potentially fetches content from user-provided domains via theagent_readiness_lint.pyscript. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad file-writing permissions within the
workspace/directory and executes several local Python scripts. It also directs the agent to invoke other high-capability skills (e.g., social posting, email sending) based on the generated output. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping of external content is specified before it is incorporated into the planning process.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell execution of local Python scripts to validate generated content.
- Evidence: Execution of
python scripts/quality_gates/banned_word_check.py,four_us_score.py,seo_lint.py, andagent_readiness_lint.py. - Context: These scripts are part of the internal Kai platform infrastructure and are used for strategic and SEO quality checks.
Audit Metadata