harness-loop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes numerous bash and Node.js helper scripts (e.g.,
generate-sprint-contract.js,enrich-sprint-contract.sh,codex-companion.sh) located in the plugin's root directory to handle state validation, contract generation, and review processes. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: It dynamically determines its installation path (
HARNESS_PLUGIN_ROOT) using environment variables and directory backtracking, subsequently using this computed path to execute internal scripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow reads task descriptions and 'Definition of Done' criteria from
Plans.mdand passes them to a sub-agent via the Agent tool. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data in the plan could influence sub-agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
Plans.mdis parsed for task IDs and descriptions in Step 1. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instruction-ignoring delimiters are specified for the interpolated content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash,Edit,Read, andScheduleWakeupacross its operational flow. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content extracted from
Plans.mdis performed before processing. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages state, locks, and task contracts within the
.claude/state/directory, which involves reading and writing potentially sensitive project workflow data.
Audit Metadata