harness-plan-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute a suite of local management scripts (scripts/render-html.sh,scripts/plan-brief-open.sh,scripts/load-cross-project-groups.sh).\n - In Step 2 (alt), the skill instructs the agent to pass a user-provided value directly into a shell command:
bash scripts/load-cross-project-groups.sh --group "<name>". This pattern creates a command injection surface if the agent does not properly sanitize the<name>argument before execution.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of ingesting and processing external data.\n - Ingestion points: Data is fetched from
harness-memsearch results (past decisions, patterns, and archived plans) and the user's initial task description.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing the content of retrieved past plans.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool (script execution),Write(file creation), andRead(file access), and it can trigger a browser to open generated files.\n - Sanitization: While the skill mentions a redaction layer (
--with-redaction) to prevent PII leakage during cross-project searches, it does not describe sanitization or filtering logic specifically designed to prevent malicious instructions embedded in project memory from influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata