harness-plan-brief

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute a suite of local management scripts (scripts/render-html.sh, scripts/plan-brief-open.sh, scripts/load-cross-project-groups.sh).\n
  • In Step 2 (alt), the skill instructs the agent to pass a user-provided value directly into a shell command: bash scripts/load-cross-project-groups.sh --group "<name>". This pattern creates a command injection surface if the agent does not properly sanitize the <name> argument before execution.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of ingesting and processing external data.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from harness-mem search results (past decisions, patterns, and archived plans) and the user's initial task description.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing the content of retrieved past plans.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool (script execution), Write (file creation), and Read (file access), and it can trigger a browser to open generated files.\n
  • Sanitization: While the skill mentions a redaction layer (--with-redaction) to prevent PII leakage during cross-project searches, it does not describe sanitization or filtering logic specifically designed to prevent malicious instructions embedded in project memory from influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 16, 2026, 05:19 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — harness-plan-brief