moshu-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data from user-provided novel text or files, which represents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted text is ingested through local file paths (.txt, .md) or direct text pasting as described in Stage 2 of
SKILL.mdand the 'Pre前置' section ofreferences/style-learn-sop.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the sample text during analysis.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to write files to the local directory (
文风库/文风.md) and execute a Python script via shell commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the input text before it is processed by the LLM for semantic analysis.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands to perform statistical analysis using a local Python script.
- Evidence:
references/style-learn-sop.mdinstructs the agent to detect a Python interpreter and executescripts/style_profile.pywith specific flags and redirections (e.g.,"$PYBIN" {SKILL_DIR}/scripts/style_profile.py --input "$SAMPLE" --json > 文风库/画像.json). - Context: While this is a functional requirement for the skill, executing shell commands based on instructional scripts is an elevated capability that interacts with the host environment.
Audit Metadata