skills/chained1001/mo-shu/moshu-style/Gen Agent Trust Hub

moshu-style

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data from user-provided novel text or files, which represents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted text is ingested through local file paths (.txt, .md) or direct text pasting as described in Stage 2 of SKILL.md and the 'Pre前置' section of references/style-learn-sop.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the sample text during analysis.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to write files to the local directory (文风库/文风.md) and execute a Python script via shell commands.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the input text before it is processed by the LLM for semantic analysis.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands to perform statistical analysis using a local Python script.
  • Evidence: references/style-learn-sop.md instructs the agent to detect a Python interpreter and execute scripts/style_profile.py with specific flags and redirections (e.g., "$PYBIN" {SKILL_DIR}/scripts/style_profile.py --input "$SAMPLE" --json > 文风库/画像.json).
  • Context: While this is a functional requirement for the skill, executing shell commands based on instructional scripts is an elevated capability that interacts with the host environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 29, 2026, 02:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — moshu-style