pi-team
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install the
@oh-my-pi/pi-teampackage globally via npm. This package is not associated with a verified trusted organization or well-known service provided in the analysis context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
pi-teamCLI to execute system-level commands, managetmuxsessions, and interact with the file system (e.g., creating the.pi-team/directory). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Troubleshooting instructions include the use of
sudo apt install tmux, which requests elevated administrative privileges to install system prerequisites. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestration of multiple AI providers (PI, Claude, Codex, Gemini) through a single aggregation point creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Output logs from individual agents in
.pi-team/worker-*/output.logare ingested by thepi-team aggregatecommand. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands during the aggregation process.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands via
tmuxand perform file writes, which could be abused if an agent produces malicious instructions. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or output sanitization is provided for the data collected from remote AI providers.
Audit Metadata