chanjing-avatar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
create_task.pyscript accepts user-provided text via the--textargument to generate TTS audio for digital avatars. This input is interpolated into a JSON payload and sent to an external API. - Ingestion points:
create_task.pyvia the--textcommand-line argument. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate user content from API commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network POST requests to the
chanjing.ccAPI. - Sanitization: Input is escaped through standard JSON encoding using
json.dumps, but no content filtering is performed locally. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Several scripts, including
create_task.py,poll_task.py,upload_file.py, andget_upload_url.py, utilize__import__("os")to dynamically load theosmodule for environment variable access rather than using standard import statements. While the target module is static, this pattern is flagged as a dynamic execution technique. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
_auth.pyscript usessubprocess.runto execute a local Python scriptopen_login_page.pylocated in a sibling skill directory (chanjing-credentials-guard). This is used to trigger a browser-based login flow if credentials are missing. The execution is limited by a 5-second timeout and targeted to a specific internal path.
Audit Metadata