academic-paper-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent in
SKILL.mdto "Recompute the paper's own statistics... Use a quick Python script." This involves dynamic generation and execution of code based on external, untrusted content from academic manuscripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because its primary function is to ingest and process untrusted data (academic manuscripts). Attackers could embed instructions in a paper's text or metadata to influence the agent's review logic or cause the recomputation script to perform malicious actions.
- Ingestion points: External manuscripts provided by the user (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None explicitly enforced for the statistical recomputation pass.
- Capability inventory: Execution of Python scripts, shell command execution for Mermaid and Typst (SKILL.md, scripts/render-mermaid.sh).
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of manuscript data before it is processed or used in code generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell-based workflows. The file
scripts/render-mermaid.shexecutes themmdccommand with user-supplied directory arguments, andreferences/typst-rendering.mdinstructs the user/agent to runtypst compilecommands. These are legitimate for the skill's purpose but represent a surface for command injection if input paths are not carefully validated. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and relies on external tools and packages, including the Mermaid CLI (
@mermaid-js/mermaid-cli) and Typst packages (@preview/cetz:0.3.4). These are well-known services and tools within the technical ecosystem.
Audit Metadata