skills/chanmeng666/echook/audio-hooks/Gen Agent Trust Hub

audio-hooks

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates entirely through the audio-hooks CLI binary, executing subcommands for configuration, testing, and diagnostics based on user requests.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install plugins and update the CLI tool from the developer's marketplace and repository (ChanMeng666/echook).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided values for configuration keys, durations, and webhook URLs, which are then passed to the command line, creating a vulnerability surface for malformed inputs.
  • Ingestion points: User requests for notification preferences, snooze durations, and webhook URLs captured in the Mapping a request section of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not specify how to escape or delimit user input passed to the CLI.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can modify configuration files, enable/disable hooks, and perform network operations (webhooks) using the audio-hooks CLI in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: Not present in the prompt; the system relies on the underlying binary to handle input validation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to bypass user confirmation for all commands ("Do not ask the user to confirm... If they gave an instruction, run it"). This directive removes a standard safety oversight mechanism and could be exploited to perform unintended configuration changes or data restoration if the agent is manipulated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 08:07 AM