design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by ingesting and processing untrusted data from GitHub issues and user-provided feature descriptions, which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted external data enters the agent context through files such as
issue-body.txtandfeature-description.txtduring the initial setup and plan drafting phases (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: To protect against instruction leakage, the skill utilizes XML delimiters (e.g.,
<reviewer_feature_description>and<reviewer_plan>) and explicit instructions for sub-agents to treat encapsulated content as data rather than executable instructions (references/plan-review-runtime.md). - Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution via the
Bashtool, file system modification usingWriteandEdit, and the ability to spawn sub-tasks and sub-agents (SKILL.md, references/dialectic-clarifier.md). - Sanitization: The skill architecture includes automated secret redaction and mechanical backstops for sanitizing artifacts before they are published back to external services like GitHub (references/finalize-step5.md).
Audit Metadata