fix-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes pull request comments and review feedback, which are untrusted external inputs that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/fetch_pr_feedback.pyscript retrieves comment bodies and review threads from the GitHub API via theghCLI and GraphQL. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ specific delimiters or instruction-ignore warnings to encapsulate the external PR content when presenting it to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
ghCLI viasubprocess.runinscripts/fetch_pr_feedback.pyfor read-only operations. The instructions inSKILL.mdandreferences/replying.mdalso direct the agent to useghfor replying andgitfor committing changes, providing a surface for injected instructions to influence repository state. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no specific sanitization or filtering of the fetched comment text beyond basic formatting (stripping whitespace and extracting suggestion blocks).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes system commands to interact with GitHub and the local repository.
- The script
scripts/fetch_pr_feedback.pyusessubprocess.runto call theghCLI. The implementation uses a list of arguments and avoidsshell=True, which protects against basic shell injection vulnerabilities. - The skill instructions (SKILL.md and references) guide the agent to execute various
ghandgitcommands to manage the PR workflow, such asgh pr diff,gh apifor replies, and standardgitcommit/test operations.
Audit Metadata