axiom-tools
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a section titled 'Using Axiom Skills' in
SKILL.mdthat employs extremely aggressive and coercive language to hijack the AI's operational logic. It establishes 'The Rule' that mandates checking for Axiom skills before any response for iOS/Swift tasks, using phrases such as 'YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE,' 'NOT negotiable,' and 'YOU MUST USE IT.' This is a blatant attempt to override the agent's discretion and bypass standard decision-making processes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation within
skills/device-control-ref.mdincludes shell commands for mass process termination, specificallykillall -9 Simulator DeviceHub. The skill also frequently executes system-level developer tools likexcrunandsimctlto manage device states and install applications. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The file
skills/device-control-ref.mdinstructs the user or agent to executesudo xcrun mcp-server enableto activate a headless tool service. The use ofsudogrants the skill's operations elevated administrative privileges on the host machine. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on and instructs the agent to execute a suite of custom local binaries (
axbuild,xclog,xcsym,xcui,xcprof,xcproject) bundled with the skill.SKILL.mdprovides explicit logic for the agent to calculate the path to these executables at runtime (e.g.,<plugin-root>/tools/<tool>). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In
skills/xcui-ref.md, the documentation specifies that thexcui doctor --installcommand will executebrew install cameroncooke/axe/axe. This triggers the download and installation of a third-party tool from an external repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external data, such as simulator console logs (
xclog) and crash reports (xcsym). These data streams serve as ingestion surfaces where an attacker could embed malicious instructions. The skill lacks boundary markers or explicit sanitization to prevent the AI from following commands hidden within these logs.
Audit Metadata