android-design-explore
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/setup.mdfile describes a bootstrap process that automatically downloads an external JAR file (android-design-preview.jar) from GitHub Releases to the user's local cache directory. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing the downloaded
android-design-preview.jarbinary using Java. Running unverified external binaries presents a risk of executing arbitrary code on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes shell commands via the
android-design-previewtool (e.g.,check,tree,open,install) to perform UI rendering and layout checks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads several files from the local repository that may contain untrusted content.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
DESIGN.md,design/*.explore.kt, anddesign/assets/*as the basis for its design tasks. - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions that might be embedded in these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands and modify files (e.g., updating
DESIGN.md), which could be leveraged if an injection attack occurs. - Sanitization: Content from repository files is processed without explicit sanitization or validation steps.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: In
references/setup.md, the skill explicitly instructs users in restricted environments like Codex to modify their configuration (~/.codex/config.toml) to enablenetwork_access = trueand addwritable_roots. This guidance encourages users to weaken the security posture of their execution environment.
Audit Metadata