context-restore

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to manage project state, configuration, and repository files.
  • Evidence: Runs gstack-config, gstack-team-init, git rm, git add, and git commit to manage project settings and handle the migration from vendored to team mode.
  • Evidence: Uses mkdir -p, touch, find, sort, and head to manage and locate checkpoint files in the user's home directory.
  • Evidence: Uses eval to execute output from local binaries (gstack-slug and gstack-paths) to set up the environment. This pattern allows the execution of dynamically generated shell code from external binaries.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted data from checkpoint files.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads markdown files located in ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/checkpoints/ using the Read tool.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The content from the saved files (summary, notes, etc.) is interpolated directly into the agent's context without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, perform git operations, and run custom scripts/binaries.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation or escaping of the content read from the checkpoint files before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 14, 2026, 08:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — context-restore