context-restore
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to manage project state, configuration, and repository files.
- Evidence: Runs
gstack-config,gstack-team-init,git rm,git add, andgit committo manage project settings and handle the migration from vendored to team mode. - Evidence: Uses
mkdir -p,touch,find,sort, andheadto manage and locate checkpoint files in the user's home directory. - Evidence: Uses
evalto execute output from local binaries (gstack-slugandgstack-paths) to set up the environment. This pattern allows the execution of dynamically generated shell code from external binaries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted data from checkpoint files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads markdown files located in
~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/checkpoints/using theReadtool. - Boundary markers: Absent. The content from the saved files (summary, notes, etc.) is interpolated directly into the agent's context without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, perform git operations, and run custom scripts/binaries.
- Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation or escaping of the content read from the checkpoint files before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata