landing-report

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute various shell commands and local binaries, including git, gh (GitHub CLI), bun, and jq. It specifically invokes binaries located in ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/ such as gstack-config, gstack-team-init, and gstack-slug.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Employs dynamic shell execution via eval "$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-slug 2>/dev/null)". This pattern executes the output of a local script as shell commands, which can lead to arbitrary code execution if the script output is compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs state-modifying operations such as adding/committing files to git (CLAUDE.md, .gitignore), deleting directories (.claude/skills/gstack/), and creating marker files in the home directory (~/.gstack/).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Skill routing' section provides instructions that attempt to override or influence the agent's decision-making process for tool selection, prioritizing specific skills for certain types of user requests.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes and renders untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved from gh pr view and the output of bin/gstack-next-version (cached in /tmp/*.json).
  • Boundary markers: None; the skill interpolates external data directly into the dashboard output and user suggestions without delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: Access to git, gh, bun, and jq subprocesses, as well as the ability to modify project files.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from external tools before it is rendered or used to generate suggestions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 14, 2026, 08:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — landing-report