landing-report
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute various shell commands and local binaries, including
git,gh(GitHub CLI),bun, andjq. It specifically invokes binaries located in~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/such asgstack-config,gstack-team-init, andgstack-slug. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Employs dynamic shell execution via
eval "$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-slug 2>/dev/null)". This pattern executes the output of a local script as shell commands, which can lead to arbitrary code execution if the script output is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs state-modifying operations such as adding/committing files to git (
CLAUDE.md,.gitignore), deleting directories (.claude/skills/gstack/), and creating marker files in the home directory (~/.gstack/). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Skill routing' section provides instructions that attempt to override or influence the agent's decision-making process for tool selection, prioritizing specific skills for certain types of user requests.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes and renders untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from
gh pr viewand the output ofbin/gstack-next-version(cached in/tmp/*.json). - Boundary markers: None; the skill interpolates external data directly into the dashboard output and user suggestions without delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Access to
git,gh,bun, andjqsubprocesses, as well as the ability to modify project files. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from external tools before it is rendered or used to generate suggestions.
Audit Metadata