review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
evalandsourceto execute the output of local binaries, specificallyeval "$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-slug 2>/dev/null)"andsource <(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-diff-scope <base> 2>/dev/null). This allows local scripts to dynamically modify the agent's environment or execute arbitrary shell commands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from
git log,gh pr view, andTODOS.mdto extract implementation intent and actionable items. There are no explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic defined to prevent malicious instructions within these data sources from influencing the agent's behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains logic to intentionally override standard safety and interaction protocols. If the
SPAWNED_SESSIONenvironment variable is set, the agent is instructed to skipAskUserQuestionprompts and auto-choose options, which removes human-in-the-loop oversight. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a wide array of local vendor binaries (e.g.,
gstack-config,gstack-team-init,gstack-next-version) and third-party tools likecodexandbun. The execution of these tools is based on the state of the local environment and project files, which could be manipulated to trigger unintended behavior.
Audit Metadata