grill-me-codex

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several shell commands using the codex CLI tool.
  • The command codex exec ... "$(cat REVIEW_PROMPT)" uses shell command substitution to read a prompt from a file. This pattern can be risky if the file content is influenced by untrusted input.
  • The skill uses variable interpolation in shell commands, such as codex exec resume "$THREAD_ID", where the variable is parsed from the JSON output of a previous command.
  • It uses timeout or gtimeout to manage execution limits, which is a common pattern for handling external tool execution.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the transfer of local data to an external service.
  • The adversarial review process involves sending the contents of PLAN.md and potentially other files from the repository to the Codex API via the codex exec command.
  • The instructions explicitly direct the agent to read ~/.codex/config.toml to extract model information, which is a sensitive configuration file path.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The codex tool is instructed to read the plan at PLAN.md and "any repo files you need".
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or boundary markers for the repository content being reviewed by the external model.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files (PLAN.md, PLAN-REVIEW-LOG.md), execute shell commands (codex), and read local configuration files.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing the repository files before they are read by the Codex tool, allowing a malicious file in the repository to potentially influence the review outcome or the agent's behavior.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the dynamic construction of shell scripts that are then executed via the agent's bash tool, particularly during the loop between Act 1 and Act 2.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 07:02 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — grill-me-codex