grill-with-docs-codex
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to interface with the external
codexCLI tool. It specifically uses complex commands involving process substitution ($(cat ...)), piping, and redirections (e.g.,codex exec -s read-only --json -o /tmp/codex-verdict.txt ... < /dev/null). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to read the user's
~/.codex/config.tomlfile to determine the active model and echo it to the console. Accessing configuration files in the home directory is a sensitive operation, although here it is aligned with the skill's primary purpose of managing the Codex review process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by reading output generated by a secondary model (Codex) from
/tmp/codex-verdict.txtand appending it to a persistent log file (PLAN-REVIEW-LOG.md). - Ingestion points:
/tmp/codex-verdict.txt(output of external CLI tool),PLAN.md, and local project documentation. - Boundary markers: The instructions specify an exact verdict line (
VERDICT: APPROVED/REVISE), which serves as a weak delimiter, but does not include robust escaping for the critique text. - Capability inventory: Shell execution (
codex exec), file reading (cat), and file writing/appending (PLAN.md,CONTEXT.md,PLAN-REVIEW-LOG.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the external model's output is performed before it is added to the log or processed by the primary agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic shell command construction, incorporating user-defined variables (like
MAX_ROUNDSandPLAN_FILE) and reading contents of files directly into the command line via substitution ($(cat REVIEW_PROMPT)).
Audit Metadata