filesystem-context
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation of
TerminalCapture.run_commandinreferences/implementation-patterns.mdusessubprocess.run(command, shell=True). This pattern allows for arbitrary shell command execution, which is extremely dangerous if the command string is influenced by an AI agent or untrusted input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
AgentWorkspace.read_peer_findingsmethod inreferences/implementation-patterns.mdis vulnerable to path traversal attacks. It constructs file paths by joining a base directory with a user-suppliedpeer_idwithout validation, potentially allowing an attacker to read files on the system outside the intended workspace if a malicious ID (e.g.,../../etc) is provided. - [PERSISTENCE]: The "Learning Through Self-Modification" pattern (Pattern 6 in
SKILL.md) and its implementation inPreferenceStore(references/implementation-patterns.md) encourage agents to update their own instruction files. This creates a persistence mechanism where malicious instructions injected during one session can permanently alter the agent's behavior in all future sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is designed to ingest large amounts of potentially untrusted data from the filesystem into the agent's prompt context, creating a significant injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Content is read from files in
ScratchPadManager.offload,AgentWorkspace.read_peer_findings, andSkillLoader.load_skillwithinreferences/implementation-patterns.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or protective instructions are implemented in the provided patterns to isolate ingested data from the system prompt or to instruct the agent to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides access to high-privilege capabilities, including arbitrary shell execution via the
TerminalCaptureclass and file modification via thePreferenceStoreandAgentWorkspaceclasses. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content read from files before it is processed by the agent or returned to the conversation history.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata