chatcut-plugin-basics
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill describes the use of
ffmpegandffprobefor read-only diagnostics and media metadata extraction from local files. It also mentions usingcurlto download temporary rendered frames from the service's own signed URLs to a local temporary folder for inspection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Mentions the use of
node_repl jsto initialize a browser runtime if required by the host environment for browser automation tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data sources including video transcripts, project metadata, and asset names. 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested via
read_project,browse_assets, andmanage_transcripttool results inSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined for the processed data in the instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill utilizesffmpeg,curl, and a suite of MCP tools (mcp__chatcut__*) for file and project manipulation. 4. Sanitization: The instructions recommend shell-quoting URIs forcurlcalls and explicitly require stripping sensitiveeditor-boot-tokenparameters from URLs before displaying them to the user. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains a defensive instruction to prevent credential leakage by requiring the agent to remove sensitive tokens (
editor-boot-token) from internal-browser URLs before presenting them as external links to the user. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes specific instructions on how to handle user communication for authentication failures and project handoffs. These instructions, which were flagged by static detectors as potential concealment, are actually transparency guidelines that ensure the user is informed of specific steps for authentication (e.g., using
codex mcp login chatcut) rather than receiving vague error messages.
Audit Metadata