video-translation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests potentially untrusted data from both external transcript files and user-supplied text areas during the review process.
- Ingestion points: Source transcripts are read from the
library/*.mddirectory using theread_scripttool (Step 4), and user-modified transcript revisions are collected via thereviewedSourceTranscriptform field (Step 6). - Boundary markers: The skill relies on XML tags for its widget-based review system, defining clear start and end points for user-controlled data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to submit data to the
submit_video_translationtool, which triggers backend media processing and credit-based billing. - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly mandate the use of XML attribute escaping when placing recognized text into the widget's
defaultfield. It also enforces a human-in-the-loop review process where the agent must wait for explicit user submission via the widget before proceeding to the final translation step.
Audit Metadata