settle-blockers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/blockers.pyscript executes thegh(GitHub CLI) utility usingsubprocess.runto interact with the GitHub API and modify issue states. Evidence: Theghfunction inblockers.pywrapssubprocess.run(["gh", *args], ...)and is used for operations likeissue editandapi graphql. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it instructs the agent to interpret untrusted content from GitHub issues to make logical decisions. 1. Ingestion points: The skill fetches issue titles and bodies from GitHub repositories via the
read_issueandopen_issuesfunctions inscripts/blockers.py. 2. Boundary markers: While the subagent brief provides a structured task, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the retrieved issue text. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify GitHub issue bodies and 'blocked-by' metadata through thekeepanddropcommands inscripts/blockers.py. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from issue bodies before it is processed by the agent or recorded back to GitHub. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches issue data and repository information from GitHub to perform its analysis. Evidence: Functions in
scripts/blockers.pyperform GraphQL queries against GitHub to retrieve issue nodes and their metadata.
Audit Metadata