setup-knowledge-vault
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from a user-specified Obsidian vault, including PDFs, transcripts, and Markdown notes. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in these external documents could potentially influence the agent's behavior during synthesis or research tasks.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads from the absolute vault path configured in
.agent/context/knowledge-vault.mdand processes files within that directory (e.g.,SKILL.md,knowledge-vault-template.md). - Boundary markers: While the skill defines conventions for note structure (Title Case, wikilinks), it does not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" prompts to isolate the content of ingested research materials.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes filesystem tools (Read, Write, Glob, Grep) and suggests the use of shell commands like
pdftotext,find, andgrepfor data extraction and search (SKILL.md,knowledge-vault-template.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed by the model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and recipes suggest that the agent should execute shell commands for maintenance and data extraction tasks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandknowledge-vault-template.mdprovide example commands such as `pdftotext "/path/to/Paper.pdf" - | head -200
andgrep -rl "[[Some Concept]]" "{{VAULT_PATH}}"`. While these are routine for vault management, they represent an active use of the system's command-line interface.
Audit Metadata