setup-knowledge-vault

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from a user-specified Obsidian vault, including PDFs, transcripts, and Markdown notes. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in these external documents could potentially influence the agent's behavior during synthesis or research tasks.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads from the absolute vault path configured in .agent/context/knowledge-vault.md and processes files within that directory (e.g., SKILL.md, knowledge-vault-template.md).
  • Boundary markers: While the skill defines conventions for note structure (Title Case, wikilinks), it does not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" prompts to isolate the content of ingested research materials.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes filesystem tools (Read, Write, Glob, Grep) and suggests the use of shell commands like pdftotext, find, and grep for data extraction and search (SKILL.md, knowledge-vault-template.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed by the model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and recipes suggest that the agent should execute shell commands for maintenance and data extraction tasks.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and knowledge-vault-template.md provide example commands such as `pdftotext "/path/to/Paper.pdf"
  • | head -200andgrep -rl "[[Some Concept]]" "{{VAULT_PATH}}"`. While these are routine for vault management, they represent an active use of the system's command-line interface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 10:19 PM