webcraft-direction
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in
references/motion.mdandreferences/upstream.mddirect the agent to fetch external skill definitions (SKILL.md) and supporting files from theemilkowalski/skillsandjakubkrehel/skillsrepositories on GitHub at runtime. These sources are not recognized as trusted organizations or well-known services. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The mechanism for fetching and incorporating external instructions from non-trusted repositories creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Content is dynamically retrieved from external GitHub repositories as specified in
references/motion.mdandreferences/upstream.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit warnings to ignore "unrelated upstream workflow automation" and "upstream greetings," and to preserve the user's preferences over fetched guidance.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write files (
05-direction.md), interact with the browser (chrome-devtools-cli), manage local servers (hitch), and run project scripts via package managers. - Sanitization: The skill explicitly forbids the automatic execution of downloaded scripts or the starting of subagents suggested by the fetched content, though the agent still reads and follows the imported instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local environment tools including
chrome-devtools-cli,hitch, and project-specific package managers (e.g., npm, pip) and scripts to render design concepts and perform browser-based inspections.
Audit Metadata