spriterrific-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download updates from the author's GitHub repository.
- Evidence: Found in the "Skill version handshake" section:
https://github.com/chongdashu/spriterrific-skills/releases/latest/download/spriterrific-api-skill.zip. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The update procedure involves unzipping a remote archive directly into the project root, which overwrites existing skill definitions.
- Evidence: Instructions state to "unzip it at the project root (it refreshes both .claude/skills/ and .agents/skills/ copies)". This is a form of self-modifying code execution.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data which could potentially contain malicious instructions meant for the sprite-generation engine or the agent.
- Ingestion points: The
sourceImageUrlparameter (remote image URL) andeditPrompt/actionContextfields (user-controlled text). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are defined for these inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
curlfor network operations and writing files to the local file system. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input strings is mentioned before they are sent to the API.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands for API interaction and file management.
- Evidence: Multiple examples using
curlto send POST/GET requests and save artifacts locally using-oflags.
Audit Metadata