david-copy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command (
mkdir -p ./audit-reports/{target-slug}) using a slug derived from user-supplied$ARGUMENTS. While the instructions suggest converting the argument to a URL-safe name, this relies on the agent's interpretation and creates a risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters that are not effectively sanitized before execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as its primary function is to ingest and analyze untrusted text provided by users.
- Ingestion points: Written content, copy, and UI text provided via
$ARGUMENTSfor audit and review (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions or delimiters used to ensure the agent treats the content strictly as data and ignores any embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to create directories (
mkdir) and write files to the local file system (saving reports inaudit-reports/andplanning-docs/). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or filtering logic for the input text before processing.
Audit Metadata