auto-decorrelation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes findings from external AI sidecars (e.g., Codex, Gemini), which can be manipulated to include malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads output from sidecar processes stored in files like
out.txt. - Boundary markers: It requires all accepted findings to be source-groundable (referencing specific file lines or quoting text) to prevent phantom findings.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Bash,Grep, andGlobtools for processing these outputs. - Sanitization: A residency closure scan (
scripts/residency_closure_scan.py) is performed on all payloads before they are sent to external models to prevent data leakage. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands and local scripts to orchestrate sidecar discovery and verification.
- Evidence: Executes
scripts/sidecar_wait.sh,scripts/target_freeze.sh, andscripts/residency_closure_scan.py. - Evidence: Invokes external command-line interfaces including
codex,agy,gemini, andgh copilot. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes well-known service tools that may perform background downloads during initialization.
- Evidence: References
gh copilotfor verification, noting that the launcher may fetch the core CLI component upon its first invocation.
Audit Metadata