deep-clarify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input to generate specification documents in
.claude/specs/which are intended for use by downstream agents. - Ingestion points: User's initial ambiguous requests and subsequent dialogue responses are ingested into the agent context in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured Socratic dialogue but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded commands when interpolating user goals into the final Markdown specification.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for directory management (mkdir -p) and file verification (test -f), and theWritetool to save the resulting document. The generated specs are explicitly intended to be passed to other agents likeagent-composer. - Sanitization: While the skill applies sanitization to the filename (slug generation), it does not explicitly sanitize the user-provided content before writing it to the document, creating a trust boundary issue where a user could embed instructions for the next agent in the pipeline.
Audit Metadata