dialogue-harvest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data in the form of dialogue logs or pasted text.
- Ingestion points: In Step 0, the skill reads files from user-provided paths or processes text pasted into the chat context.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or instructions to ignore embedded instructions within the logs being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Grep, andGlobtools, and it is instructed to perform complex extraction logic based on the content of the logs. - Sanitization: There is no mentioned logic to strip or escape potentially malicious instructions (e.g., "Ignore previous instructions") before the model processes the utterances into propositions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Step 4-b involves using the
Greptool to search through 'consumer assets' (other files in the environment) using search patterns derived from the processed dialogue logs. - The instructions explicitly mention constructing
greppatterns (e.g.,grep -E "core_term|title") and discuss shell-specific behaviors like variable expansion and quoting. - If a malicious log contains propositions designed to manipulate these search patterns (e.g., regex injection or pattern-based data extraction), the agent could be manipulated into reading or exposing sensitive information from other files.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates search commands in Step 4-b by extracting 'core frames' or 'key terms' from the user-provided log and interpolating them into tool invocations. While restricted to the
Greptool, the logic relies on runtime assembly of search strings based on untrusted input.
Audit Metadata