harvest-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform repository maintenance, file system scans, and invoke external CLI tools. Scripts inSKILL_detail.mdutilizefind,grep,git log, andsortto automate decision-making processes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to send project data, synthesized patterns, and skill proposals to external AI services for validation (
Step 3.5-X). - Evidence:
SKILL_detail.mdcontains bash commands that pipe data togeminiandclaude --printto perform adversarial reviews. - Context: The destinations are well-known and trusted services, but the skill facilitates the transmission of internal project context to these external endpoints.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant surface area for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from git logs and session outputs to generate new logic and rules.
- Ingestion points:
Step 0-a(git diff),Step 0-b(git log), andStep 1(field git diff and session outputs) serve as entry points for external data. - Boundary markers: Absent. The prompts defined in
SKILL_detail.md(e.g.,§Step3-75) interpolate ingested data without specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has
WriteandBashaccess, allowing it to modify project instructions or execute shell commands based on the results of the automated analysis. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested git/output data is documented before it is passed to the LLM or used in script generation.
- [AUTONOMY_CONCERNS]: The skill defines a 'Forced mode' intended for local development environments where the pipeline executes automatically at the end of a session without requiring user approval for the execution steps.
Audit Metadata