qp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external inputs, specifically a web URL or application name (
<target>), and incorporates them directly into shell commands. This creates a surface where a maliciously crafted URL or name could attempt to inject shell operators to execute unauthorized commands or influence the agent's logic. - Ingestion points: The
<target>parameter inqp <target>calls, sourced from user requests. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or escaping mechanisms to isolate the untrusted target input from the command structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,Write, andReadtools, enabling it to execute scripts and modify files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic in the skill's instructions to verify the integrity of the target string before execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local bash scripts (
plugins/fh-qp/scripts/qp_tools.sh,scripts/cluster_capability_scan.sh, andscripts/test_fh_qp_lanes.sh) to perform core operations like target classification and adapter probing. While these are project-internal paths, the reliance on shell execution with user-controlled parameters is a notable security surface. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically discovers and executes functionality by scanning for capability files in
.claude/capabilities/**/*.capand running a discovery script. This runtime resolution of executable entry points based on file system content introduces a layer of dynamic behavior that should be monitored for unexpected modifications to the local environment.
Audit Metadata