video-ingest

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from YouTube videos, including auto-generated or human-provided transcripts and visual frames.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via yt-dlp JSON output (transcripts) and ffmpeg frame extraction (images) from external URLs.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or XML tags to wrap ingested transcript content to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the video text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, allowing for shell command execution, and the Read tool for file system access.
  • Sanitization: While the skill mentions "normalization" of output, it lacks explicit security sanitization to filter out prompt injection payloads from transcripts.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests the use of external software and repositories not belonging to a pre-verified trusted vendor.
  • Evidence: The skill suggests updating yt-dlp via pip install -U yt-dlp and mentions an external repository github.com/bradautomates/claude-video for execution, suggesting brew install for its dependencies.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute complex shell commands, including yt-dlp for metadata and transcript extraction.
  • Evidence: Execution of yt-dlp with various flags and piping output to files in /tmp/.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses inline scripts to process data at runtime.
  • Evidence: A python3 -c one-liner is used to parse and regex-process JSON data produced by yt-dlp.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 12:47 AM