video-ingest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from YouTube videos, including auto-generated or human-provided transcripts and visual frames.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
yt-dlpJSON output (transcripts) andffmpegframe extraction (images) from external URLs. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or XML tags to wrap ingested transcript content to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the video text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, allowing for shell command execution, and theReadtool for file system access. - Sanitization: While the skill mentions "normalization" of output, it lacks explicit security sanitization to filter out prompt injection payloads from transcripts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests the use of external software and repositories not belonging to a pre-verified trusted vendor.
- Evidence: The skill suggests updating
yt-dlpviapip install -U yt-dlpand mentions an external repositorygithub.com/bradautomates/claude-videofor execution, suggestingbrew installfor its dependencies. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute complex shell commands, includingyt-dlpfor metadata and transcript extraction. - Evidence: Execution of
yt-dlpwith various flags and piping output to files in/tmp/. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses inline scripts to process data at runtime.
- Evidence: A
python3 -cone-liner is used to parse and regex-process JSON data produced byyt-dlp.
Audit Metadata