bilibili-transcribe
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/batch_transcribe.pyusessubprocess.runto calltranscribe.pyfor each entry in the input file. Although it uses argument lists to prevent shell injection, it represents dynamic process creation based on external file content.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Thescripts/transcribe.pyscript loads a transcription model from ModelScope withtrust_remote_code=True. This allows the execution of arbitrary Python code included in the remote model repository (iic/SenseVoiceSmall) during the model initialization process.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads video data, audio, and subtitles from Bilibili, and fetches machine learning models from ModelScope. These are functional requirements but involve external network dependencies.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted video metadata and subtitles. - Ingestion points:
scripts/transcribe.pyparses Bilibili video titles and subtitle files. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used when interpolating external content into the Markdown output.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses and perform network requests.
- Sanitization: While filenames are sanitized, the primary content of the transcribed Markdown is not filtered for malicious instructions.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The initialization of the
funasrmodel involves loading and executing code from a remote repository, which is a form of dynamic execution.
Audit Metadata