youtube-transcribe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and processes it through an LLM.
- Ingestion points: YouTube video subtitles and audio transcripts are fetched in
scripts/transcribe.pyusingytdlpandfunasrwrappers. - Boundary markers: None. The transcript text is interpolated directly into the translation prompt in
translate_textwithout delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the local system (
.mdoutput) and execute subprocesses (yt-dlp,ffmpeg,funasr). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the transcript content before it is sent to the DeepSeek API for translation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on external CLI tools and subprocess management.
- Evidence:
scripts/batch_transcribe.pyusessubprocess.run()to executescripts/transcribe.py. Additionally,scripts/transcribe.pyuses theytdlpwrapper to invoke theyt-dlpcommand-line tool for metadata and media retrieval. While these calls use list-based arguments (reducing shell injection risk), they represent a significant local execution capability. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs several network operations to external services.
- Evidence: It fetches video data from YouTube, interacts with the DeepSeek API (
api.deepseek.com) for text translation, and downloads AI models from ModelScope (iic/SenseVoiceSmall). These are well-known services and organizations, but the skill's functionality is fundamentally dependent on external data retrieval.
Audit Metadata