aliyun-wan-video
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The scripts
scripts/generate_video.pyandscripts/generate_dancing_video.pyare designed to read sensitive authentication tokens from the local Alibaba Cloud credentials file at~/.alibabacloud/credentials. This facilitates interaction with the cloud provider but exposes local system secrets to the skill's execution context. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
urllib.requestto download generated video and image files from remote URLs. These URLs are retrieved dynamically from the Alibaba Cloud DashScope API responses after processing the user's requests. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user text to drive AI model behavior and subsequent system actions.
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts and reference image paths are accepted in the
generate_video.pyandgenerate_dancing_video.pyscripts and passed directly to the DashScope API. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or defensive instructions are implemented to prevent the model from interpreting malicious commands embedded within the user's prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network access (via
urllib.request.urlopen) to fetch remote content and file system write permissions (viaPath.write_bytes) to save assets locally. - Sanitization: The input is processed as standard strings without specific sanitization or filtering intended to detect or neutralize prompt injection attempts.
Audit Metadata