circleci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted external data by instructing the agent on how to retrieve job outputs and test results using the
circleci job output getandcircleci testresult listcommands. This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in build logs could attempt to override the agent's behavior during log analysis or troubleshooting tasks. - Ingestion points: Build logs and job outputs accessed via
circleci job output listandcircleci job output getas documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack guidance for the agent to treat these external outputs as untrusted data or to use specific delimiters to isolate the content from its system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the full
circleciCLI, which includes the ability to manage environment variables, trigger pipelines, and list secrets, providing a path for potential exploitation if an injection succeeds. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or filtering the output before the agent processes the retrieved text.
Audit Metadata