ego-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/install.shscript downloads an executable DMG file from an external server athttps://cdn.ego.app. This introduces unverified binary code into the local environment.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation script executes remote code by mounting the downloaded DMG and running theinstallercommand or usingopento launch the application. Theego-browser nodejstool further enables the execution of arbitrary Node.js scripts via heredocs provided by the agent.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes high-risk commands withinscripts/install.sh, including usingsudoto escalate privileges for file replacement and system-level installation. It also usesxattr -dr com.apple.quarantineto explicitly bypass OS-level security warnings and Gatekeeper protections for the downloaded binary.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is specifically designed to inherit and reuse the user's browser login state, providing programmatic access to private, authenticated web sessions. When combined with theserverFetchandbrowserFetchhelpers, this allows for the exfiltration of session tokens and personal data. TheuploadFilehelper also provides a mechanism to transmit local files to remote endpoints.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external websites (e.g., Google, X) throughsnapshotTextand screenshots. This exposes the agent to indirect prompt injection, where an attacker could embed malicious instructions in a web page to manipulate the agent's behavior during automated browsing tasks.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata