ego-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's installation script attempts to gain administrative privileges and bypass system security settings.
- Evidence: In
scripts/install.sh, therun_with_sudo_if_neededfunction is used to executerm,mv, andinstallercommands as root. - Evidence: In
scripts/install.sh, the script executesxattr -dr com.apple.quarantineto remove macOS Gatekeeper protection from the downloaded application. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads binary artifacts from an external vendor domain during setup.
- Evidence: In
scripts/install.sh,curlis used to fetch.dmgfiles fromhttps://cdn.ego.app/setup/macos/arm64/egolite-fHoqgZ74bOEM.dmgandhttps://cdn.ego.app/setup/macos/x64/egolite-fHoqgZ74bOEM.dmg. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads and executes an external application on the host system.
- Evidence:
scripts/install.shdownloads a disk image (DMG), mounts it usinghdiutil, and installs the contained application to the/Applicationsdirectory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to manage its environment and execute browser automation logic.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides examples of usingego-browser nodejswith heredocs to execute arbitrary Node.js code. - Evidence:
references/install.mdinstructs the user to run the installation script usingsh skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interacts with and extracts data from arbitrary websites, creating a path for malicious content to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
page.snapshot()andpage.evaluate()inSKILL.mdextract content from untrusted web pages into the agent context. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for data processed from the browser.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file writes (
download.saveAs), network requests (page.fetch), and execute shell commands through theego-browserCLI. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or output escaping for data extracted from web pages before it is processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill enables the agent to generate and execute code at runtime.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddocuments thepage.evaluate(fnOrString)method, which executes arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context. - Evidence: The core functionality relies on passing JavaScript strings to the
ego-browser nodejscommand for execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata