jta
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads a compiled binary (
jta) from an external GitHub repository (github.com/hikanner/jta) and executes it. This allows for the execution of arbitrary code provided by the repository owner on the local system. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation process described in
SKILL.mdand automated inscripts/install.shusessudo mvto move the downloaded binary into/usr/local/bin/. This requires administrative credentials and grants the external binary elevated status on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to perform environment detection, download files from the internet, modify file permissions, and execute system commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curl -Lto fetch multiple platform-specific binaries fromgithub.com/hikanner/jta, which is not a recognized trusted source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied JSON i18n files through an "Agentic reflection" mechanism. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the JSON files could influence or hijack the AI's translation and reflection logic.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly checks for and uses sensitive environment variables (
OPENAI_API_KEY,ANTHROPIC_API_KEY,GEMINI_API_KEY) and passes provider information to the third-party binary, potentially exposing these credentials to an unverified tool.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata