skills/ckanner/agent-skills/jta/Gen Agent Trust Hub

jta

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads a compiled binary (jta) from an external GitHub repository (github.com/hikanner/jta) and executes it. This allows for the execution of arbitrary code provided by the repository owner on the local system.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation process described in SKILL.md and automated in scripts/install.sh uses sudo mv to move the downloaded binary into /usr/local/bin/. This requires administrative credentials and grants the external binary elevated status on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to perform environment detection, download files from the internet, modify file permissions, and execute system commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses curl -L to fetch multiple platform-specific binaries from github.com/hikanner/jta, which is not a recognized trusted source.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied JSON i18n files through an "Agentic reflection" mechanism. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the JSON files could influence or hijack the AI's translation and reflection logic.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly checks for and uses sensitive environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY) and passes provider information to the third-party binary, potentially exposing these credentials to an unverified tool.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 07:39 AM