website-publisher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
shell_execto run deployment commands for external services includingnetlify-cli,vercel,wrangler, andrsync. These operations are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of publishing rendered content to web hosts. - [SAFE]: Credentials and deployment tokens are managed securely by reading from environment variables (
process.env) at runtime rather than being stored in the skill configuration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's blog post drafting feature uses project data as input, which constitutes a surface for indirect prompt injection. However, this is significantly mitigated by a required human review process before any generated content is published.
- Ingestion points: Chapter summaries, user-model data, and craft-critic flags ingested via the
POST /api/blog-posts/draftendpoint (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are defined in the instructions for separating untrusted project data from the generation prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
shell_execandfile_writepermissions, which could be exploited if an indirect injection bypassed agent safety layers. - Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization is described, but the workflow enforces a "pending review" state, requiring manual author approval for all generated drafts.
Audit Metadata