codex-advisor

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to install the global package @openai/codex via npm and a cask named codex via Homebrew. These are not official or standard packages distributed by OpenAI, creating a potential supply chain risk or dependency confusion vector.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from external sources such as git diffs and arbitrary project files, creating an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested from codebase paths via -C ., git diff, and direct file targets such as src/auth/login.ts in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The command templates append or pipe raw data directly into the execution prompt without formatting wrappers or isolation tags.
  • Capability inventory: The skill triggers command-line execution using the codex exec command.
  • Sanitization: No input validation, character escaping, or filtration mechanisms are defined to sanitize the inputs before passing them to the external CLI.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 04:46 PM