nano-banana
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install MCP servers using
npx -y nanobanana-mcpandnpx nano-banana-mcp. These commands download packages from the public NPM registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing downloaded third-party code via the
npxcommand. While the recommended package name aligns with the skill's identity, the alternative reference to ConechoAI introduces an external dependency from an untrusted third party. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill documentation includes misleading information, claiming to support 'Gemini 3.1' models and referencing a launch date of 'February 2026'. This metadata deception may lead to a misjudgment of the skill's actual capabilities or safety.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts natural language briefs from users which are used to generate parameters for image generation and editing tools.
- Ingestion points: User briefs processed by the system prompt defined in
references/translator-prompt.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide delimiters or negative constraints to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in user-supplied data.
- Capability inventory: The skill calls MCP tools to generate images and write them to the local file system (
~/Documents/nanobanana_generated/). - Sanitization: The skill translates free-text user input into structured JSON schemas before tool execution, acting as a normalization layer.
Audit Metadata